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Abstract
White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that the optimal subsidy,
equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are identical before and after
privatization of a public firm in a mixed oligopolistic market. We show that we can obtain
these irrelevance results even though partial privatization introduced by Matsumura (1998) is
considered.
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Recently a number of paper have studied “mixed markets” in which public and private
ﬁrms compete. These studies assume that the public ﬁrm maximizes social welfare,
deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus and ﬁrm proﬁts while the private ﬁrm maxi-
mizes its own proﬁt. Under these assumptions, the existing work has investigated the
consequences of privatization. DeFraja and Delbono (1989) shows that privatization of
the public ﬁrm is desirable in terms of social welfare when the number of existing pri-
vate ﬁrms is large. Governmental interventions such as a production subsidy considered,
however, this is not always true. By using simultaneous-moves oligopoly, White (1996)
showed privatization of the public ﬁrm is fruitless because if the subsidy is utilized, then
under the optimal output subsidy, all ﬁrms’ output, proﬁts and social welfare are iden-
tical before and after privatization of the public ﬁrm. Also, Poyago-Theotoky (2001)
and Myles (2002) show that the optimal output subsidy is identical and proﬁts, output
and social welfare are also identical irrespective of whether (i) the public ﬁrm moves
simultaneously with the private ﬁrms or (ii) the public ﬁrm acts as a Stackelberg leader
or (iii) all ﬁrms behave as proﬁt-maximizers. These are called ‘irrelevance results.’
They neglect the possibility of partial privatization, however. In many cases, even
though public ﬁrms are partially privatized, the public sector (or the government) holds
a non-negligible share in the privatized ﬁrms. In this paper, we provide a much stronger
‘irrelevance’ result in the sense of being taken into account partial privatization intro-
duced by Matsumura (1998). Focusing on simultaneous-moves game, we show that the
optimal subsidy, all ﬁrms’ output, proﬁts and social welfare are identical regardless of
the share in the privated ﬁrm a public sector holds.
2 The model and main result
In a single market for a homogeneous good, there exist n identical private ﬁrms and one
partially privatized ﬁrm which is jointly owned by both the public and private sectors.
Following earlier work, we assume demand is linear, P = a¡Q, where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi +q0
1and qi is the output of private ﬁrm i and q0 is the output of the privatized ﬁrm. All
ﬁrms have identical technologies, represented by the quadratic cost function C(qj) =
c + (1=2)kq2
j (j = 0;1;2;¢¢¢ ;n) and k > 01. We assume c = 0 with no loss of generality
since we do not consider entry issues.














i + sqi ; (1)













0 + sq0 ; (2)
and social welfare is given by










where CS = (1=2)Q2 represents consumer surplus. Following Matsumura (1998), the
public sector owns a share ® 2 [0;1] of the partially privatized ﬁrm which chooses its
output q0 to maximize the weighted average of social welfare and its own proﬁt. Let the
partially privatized ﬁrm’s objective be U0. This is given by
































Note that if the privatized ﬁrm is completely privatized (® = 0), then it becomes a
private ﬁrm and sets its output to maximize its own proﬁt. Also note that if the ﬁrm
is completely nationalized (® = 1), then it becomes a public ﬁrm and sets its output to
maximize social welfare. To sum up, we can interpret (1¡®) as the level of privatization
1Our claim in this paper can be proved in more general setting by the same way as Myles (2002).
To help understanding our model, we dare to use linear demand and the quadratic cost function.
2of the privatized ﬁrm. The level of privatization becomes higher (lower) when ® becomes
lower (higher)2.
2.1 Simultaneous-moves game
There are two stages: in stage 1 the government determines the output subsidy to
maximize social welfare for a given ®; in stage 2 all ﬁrms choose their output conditional
on the output subsidy. We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) as our
equilibrium concept. Now we solve for the second stage equilibrium expressions ﬁrst.
Maximizing (1) and (4) simultaneously we obtain the Nash equilibrium for given s and
®:
Q(s;®) =
[(n + 1)k + n(1 ¡ ®) + 1]a + [(n + 1 ¡ ®)k + (n + 1)(1 ¡ ®)]s
k2 + (3 ¡ ® + n)k + n(1 ¡ ®) + 2 ¡ ®
; (5)
q0(s;®) =
(1 + k)a + [(1 ¡ ®)k + 1 ¡ ® ¡ n®]s
k2 + (3 ¡ ® + n)k + n(1 ¡ ®) + 2 ¡ ®
; (6)
qi(s;®) =
(1 ¡ ® + k)a + (1 + k)s
k2 + (3 ¡ ® + n)k + n(1 ¡ ®) + 2 ¡ ®
: (7)
Setting s = 0 and ® = 1 in the above expressions yields the result which many existing
studies such as DeFraja and Delbono (1989) obtain, that is, q0(0;1) > qi(0;1). When
setting only s = 0, we can also ﬁnd that q0(0;®) ¸ qi(0;®) with equality if the privatized
ﬁrm is completely privatized (® = 0). As the level of ® becomes higher, the privatized
ﬁrm becomes interested in consumer surplus. The ﬁrm has an incentive to produce more
than a private ﬁrm so as to increase total output and raise consumer surplus. Thus
the ﬁrm’s output exceeds private ﬁrm’s and the privatized ﬁrm’s marginal cost exceeds
private ﬁrm’s without the output subsidy. The eﬀects of the output subsidy on private
ﬁrm’s output and total output are positive while that of the output subsidy on the
privatized ﬁrm’s is ambiguous.
2Usually, if an entity owns more than 50 % of a ﬁrm then it obtains total control. We can modify
our model in such a way, but our results do not depend on how we model the objective function of the
partially privatized ﬁrm.
3Now consider the eﬀect of the output subsidy on social welfare. This can be written
in a general form as
@W
@s













The ﬁrst term in (8) represents resource allocation eﬀect. The eﬀect is the one which the
subsidy generates through increase in total output. The second term in (8) represents
reallocation eﬀect. This eﬀect is generated by shifting production from low-productivity
ﬁrms to high-productivity ﬁrms. If price exceeds the privatized ﬁrm’s marginal cost, then
administering the subsidy improves social welfare through resource allocation eﬀect, since
we know that the subsidy raises total output. Similarly administering the subsidy im-
proves social welfare through reallocation eﬀect as long as the privatized ﬁrm’s marginal
cost exceeds private ﬁrm’s. Subsidization raises social welfare through these two eﬀects.
In stage 1, taking into account how all ﬁrms will react to the subsidy, the government




1 + k + n
: (9)


























2(1 + k + n)
: (14)
We ﬁnd two facts from these outcomes. First, the optimal subsidy achieves the ﬁrst-best
as price equals marginal cost, P = kqj (j = 0;1;2;¢¢¢ ;n). Second, these equilibrium
outcomes do not depend on ®. These facts may seem surprising, but it can be explained
by using (8). In order to maximize social welfare, government sets the output subsidy
4to equalize @W=@s in (8) with zero. Thus the government decides the subsidy so as to
satisfy P = C0(q0) and C0(q0) = C0(qk)(k = 1;2;¢¢¢n). This indicates that subsidization
makes all ﬁrms’ costs equal and as a result, total cost in a whole industry are minimized.
It is also indicated that subsidization compels all ﬁrms to equalize their marginal cost
to price. These two facts do not depend on ®. Thus the SPNE does not rely on ®. The
preceding results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal output subsidy is independent of the share of the partially
privated ﬁrm that is owned by the public. Under the optimal subsidy, the output and
proﬁts of all ﬁrms are the same.
This proposition includes the result of White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and
Myles (2002) as a special case. In fact, they compare the case where the privatized ﬁrm
is completely privatized (® = 0) to the case where it is completely nationalized (® = 1).
3 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the optimal output subsidy, all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and
social welfare are identical regardless of how many shares in a ﬁrm public sector has,
in other words, the level of privatization of a public ﬁrm. This analysis has extended
the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky (2001) to allow for partial privatization. Our
ﬁndings has been obtained for linear demand and a quadratic cost function, but these
can be obtained for more general functions. In this sense, our irrelevance results are
robust.
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